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Strikes and Wazes: A Test of a Signalling Model 
Abstract 
This paper,  describes a simple model of labor disputes based on the 
hypothesis that unions use strikes to infer the level of profitability 
of the firm.  The implications of the model are then tested using data 
on wage outcomes, strike probabilities, and strike durations for a 
large sample of collective bargaining agreements. Negotiated wages are 
found to depend negatively on regional unemployment rates and 
positively on industry-specific selling prices.  Contrary to the basic 
premis of the model, however, there is no evidence of a  systematic 
relation between wages and strike outcomes.  Increases in unemployment 
are found to decrease the probability of strikes, while increases in 
industry selling prices increase the probability of disputes.  Strike 
durations are only weakly related to unemployment and industry prices, 
but are negatively correlated with industry output. 
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It  has long been recognized  that  any consistent  theoretical  model of 
strikes  must appeal to some form of imperfect  information)  Recently,  a 
great deal of progress in the theoretical  analysis  of strikes  has been made 
by focusing  on the simple  case of one-sided  asysunetric information,2  In 
this setup,  the underlying  profitability  of the firm is unknown to union 
members, and a strike is used by workers to price  discriminate  against  more 
profitable  employers.  This class of models  is appealing  not only for  its 
ability  to explain the occurrence  of costly  disputes,  but also for the 
richness  of its empirical implications.  Simple  signalling-type  models 
specify  the determinants  of the probability  and duration  of disputes,  as 
well as the relation  between observed  wage settlements  and their  associated 
strike  outcomes.3 
This paper is an attempt to test  both sets of implications  using  wage 
end strike information  for a large  sample  of collective  bargaining 
agreements  from the Canadian  manufacturing  sector.  In the first  section of 
the paper,  a simple  theoretical  model  is presented  that describes  wage 
rates and strike  outcomes in terms  of a small set of underlying  parameters: 
the mean and dispersion  in profitability  of the firm,  the  level  of wages 
available  to workers elsewhere in  the economy,  and the risk  preferences  of 
1The role of imperfect  information  in generating  disputes  was 
emphasized  by Hicks (1963) and many subsequent  authors,  including  in 
particular  Ashenfelter  and Johnson (1969).  Kennan (1986) provides a brief 
summary of the historical  development  of theoretical  models  of strikes. 
2See in particular  Hayes  (1984), Morton (1983),  Sobel  and Takahashi 
(1983), Fudenberg  and Tirole (1983), Crampton (1984),  and Hart (1986). 
3The empirical  implications  of simple  one-sided  asymmetric  information 
models  of strikes  are explored  by Fudenberg,  Levine,  and Ruud (1985), Tracy 
(1986,  1987),  and McConnell (1987a,  l987b). 2 
union  members.4  The model predicts  the existence  of a simple  concession 
schedule  relating lower  wage settlements  to longer  strikes.  In  addition, 
the model describes  the effects  of the predetermined  variables  on wage 
settlements  and strike  probability  and duration. 
In the second  section of the paper these  predictions  are tested 
against  the contract  data.  Industry-specific  output  and selling  prices  and 
regional  unemployment  rates  are used as indicators  for the expected 
profitability  of the firm and the alternative  opportunities  of workers. 
Models  are fit for the negotiated  wage rate,  the probability  of disputes, 
and the conditional  duration  of work stoppages.  In all cases  these  models 
include  firm-and-union-specific  bargaining  pair effects,  to abstract  from 
any systematic  differences  across  pairs. 
The results  of the empirical  analysis  do not yield  much support for 
the model,  On one hand,  there is no evidence of a systematic  negative (or 
positive)  tradeoff  between wages  and strike  duration.  On the other  hand, 
while the reduced form relation  between  wage and strike  outcomes  and 
regional  unemployment  is consistent  with the predictions  of the model, the 
relation  with industry-specific  selling  prices is not.  Other findings  also 
cast doubt on the model,  including  a  strong  correlation  between  wildcat 
strikes and subsequent  contract  strikes,  and the finding  that unexpected 
real wage changes during  the previous  contract lead to higher wages  and 
reduced strike  activity in the next one.  A simple  model of strikes  and 
wages  with one-sided  asymmetric  information  does not capture  all the 
features of the wage and strike  outcomes  in this data set. 
4The model is similar to ones developed  by Hayes (1984)  and Morton 
(1983). 3 
I.  A SimDle  Sianalling  Model of Strikes 
This section outlines  a simple  model of disputes  based on the 
hypothesis  that  unions  use strikes  to price  discriminate  against  more 
profitable  employers.5 Bargaining  power in the model rests  with the union, 
6 
who make take-it  or leave-it  offers to the firm.  With complete 
information  on the state  of demand,  the union sets higher  wages in high- 
demand states,  and lower  wages in low-demand  states.  If demand is not 
directly observable,  however, the union  cannot  rely on the  firm to reveal 
its private  information.  Nonetheless,  the union  can improve  upon the 
strategy  of a fixed  wage demand  by offering  the firm a downward  sloping 
wage-strike  schedule.  Faced  with such  a schedule,  the firm chooses a 
shorter strike  and a higher  wage in high-demand  states,  and a longer  strike 
and a lower wage in low-demand  states.  Strikes  therefore  serve  as a  signal 
for the state  of demand,  enabling the union  to price discriminate  against 
more profitable  employers. 
The focus  of the presentation  is ott  the empirical implications  of the 
model:  specifically,  the reduced-form  determinants  of wage and strike 
outcomes,  and the nature of the wage-strike  concession  schedule.  To keep 
the model as simple  as possible,  I have adopted  specific functional  form 
assumptions  that allow  explicit solutions  for wage and strike outcomes. 
The driving  variable in the model is the value  of output,  G,  which is 
assumed to be a random  variable  whose realization  is known to the firm,  but 
5The basic idea  of this class  of models  was developed  independently  by 
Hayes (1984) and Morton (1983).  The model presented  here is more similar 
to Morton's. 
6Kennan (1986,  pp. 1104-1110)  develops  a simple  cooperative  bargaining 
model that  has many of the same features. 4 
unknown to workers.  I assume  that  8  is uniformly  distributed  on the 
interval [81,82], and that  output  per worker  per unit of  time  is fixed.8 
Bargaining  involves  the determination  of a wage payment  w and a strike 
length  s.  It is convenient  to think  of s as the fraction  of some  exogenous 
contract  period  lost to a work stoppage.  During the remaining  period  each 
worker  produces (1 -  s)  units of  output.  The firm's  profits per worker, 
given 8, w,  and  s, are 
(1)  (1-a)  (8-w). 
During  a work stoppage,  union  members earn  an opportunity  wage a. 
Total receipts per worker  are therefore 
(2)  r  (1-a)  w  +  s  a. 
I assume that the opportunity  wage is always  less than 8l the lower  bound 
of 8, so that full  production  (i.e.  s—O)  is optimal in the absence of 
asymmetric  information.  Workers  are assumed to evaluate  a particular 
distribution  of receipts  according  to the expected  value  of u(r)  ,  where  u 
is a constant  absolute risk  aversion  utility function  with risk parameter 
R. 
The bargaining  problem  can be thought  of as one of choosing  a wage- 
strike schedule  w(s)  that  maximizes  E(u(r))  subject  to the constraint  that 
for any given schedule  w(s),  and any realization  of productivity,  the firm 
will choose  a profit-maximizing  strike  length.9  The union is assumed to 
7For much of the theoretical  analysis  it is sufficient  to have 8 
distributed  on a closed interval  with strictly  positive  density  and a 
strictly increasing  hazard function. 
8Alternatively,  9 can be interpreted  as the realization  of a 
productivity  shock. 
9For a given  wage-strike  schedule,  the model is therefore  formally 
equivalent to Ashenfelter  and Johnson's (1969)  model  of strikes. 5 
have information  on the value of a and on the parameters  of the 
distribution  of 8.  Variation  over time  in  wage and strike  outcomes 
therefore  reflects  predictable  variation due to changes in these 
parameters,  and unpredictable  variation  due to the specific  realization 
of 8. 
Analytically,  it is more convenient  to express  the bargaining  problem 
as one of choosing  a pair of functions  w(9) and s(8) to maximize the 
expected utility  of union receipts,  subject  to the incentive  compatibility 
constraint  that the firm is willing to declare  8  truthfully,  and subject  to 
the  individual  rationality  constraint  that  profits  are large  enough in 
every state to induce  the firm to participate  in the agreement.  Let 
11(0,8)  denote  the profits of the firm  when productivity  is 8 and it 
declares  a level  of productivity  8,  and let  11(8)  11(9,0).  Then 
11(8,8)  — (1  -  s(0))  (8 - 
—  11(9)  +  (1 
- s(8))  (9 
-  8). 
The incentive  compatibility  constraint  is 
11(0)  >  11(0,9)  —  11(0) +  (1  - s(9))  (0  -  8). 
Reversing the roles  of 8 and 8 leads  to a conformable  expression  which  may 
be combined  with this  one to yield 
(3)  (1 -  s(8))  (8 
-  0)  >  11(9) 
-  11(8)  >  (1 
-  s(8))  (8  -  9). 
Since strike  length  is bounded between 0 and 1,  equation (3) implies  that 
11(9) is non-decreasing  in 8.  A  comparison  of the right-  and left-hand 
expressions  of (3) also shows that s(8)  is non-increasing  in  8. 
Furthermore,  (3) implies  that  11(0)  is  convex,  and therefore  differentiable 
almost  everywhere,  with derivative 
II'(0)  — (1 
-  s(8)). 6 
Assuming that the firm can earn zero profits  by simply  closing  down, 
the individual  rationality  constraint  is 11(G) > 0 for all 6.  Since 11  is 
non-decreasing,  this condition  is satisfied  if and only if  >  0. 
Thus necessary  conditions  for incentive  compatibility  and individual 
rationality  are 
11(G1) 
> 0,  s(9) non-increasing  (and  between  0 and 1)  and 
11  (9) 
J  (1 
- s(9') d9' 
It is straightforward  to show that  these three  conditions  are also 
sufficient  for incentive  compatibility  and individual  rationality. 
If  11(9),  w(G),  and s(G) are differentiable  at a point  6, with a < 1  and 
s'(9)  0, then the condition  1I'(9)  1  - s(9)  implies 
dw(s)/ds  w'(9)/s'(9)  —  -  (6 
- w(9))/(l 
- s(9))  —  -  11/fl. 
This is the tangency condition  between  the isoprofit  contours  of the firm 
and the wage concession  schedule illustrated  by Farber  (1978)  in his 
exposition  of the Ashenfelter-Johnson  model. 
Using equations (1) and (2) worker receipts  in state  9 can be written 
as 
r(9)  — 9  (1 -  s(9))  -  11(9)  +  s(O)  a. 
Thus the problem of maximizing  E(u(r))  subject to incentive  compatibility 
and individual  rationality  is equivalent  to 7 
e 
(4)  max 
J 2 u(9(l-s(0))  -  11(9)  +  s(9)a  )  f(9) dO 
s(9)  81 
subject  to: 
11(8I) 
> 
1 >  s(9) > 0 
— I -  s(8)  a.e. 
s(8) non-increasing, 
where f(9) —  / (O 
-  denotes  the density function  of 9. 
Provided that the monotonicity  constraint  on s  is never binding, this 
problem can be solved  by conventional  optimal control  techniques,  treating 
s as the control  variable and  11  as the state  variable.  I shall  proceed 
under this assumption  and then show that  constraint  is not in fact binding. 
The Hamiltonian  function  is 
H(11,s,9)  — u(9(l -s)  -  II + sa)  +  .t(9)  (1 -  s(0)), 
where  is the co-state  variable.  The necessary  conditions  for an optimum 
are 
(5a)  8H/3s  =  (a 
-  8)  u'(r(O))  f(8)  -  ,u(0)  0  (0 < s < 1), 
(5b)  3H/81T  —  -  M'(O)  —  -u'(r(9))  f(0), 
(5c)  /(82) 
—  0. 
The Hamiltonian  is concave in  a if u is a concave  function,  or equivalently 
if the index of absolute risk  aversion is positive. 
Using (Sb) and (5c) the value of the co-state  variable can be written 
as 
(8)  —  JG2.((9)) 
f(6')  dO'. 
Substituting  this expression  into (5a) and using the expression  for  the 
uniform density  function,  the first-order  condition  for an interior  strike S 
length  is 
(6)  (8 
-  a)  u'(r(8))  -  j 
L 
u'(r(8'))  dO' 
9 
Notice that if  u' is constant (i.e., workers  are risk  neutral) then this 
expression  is independent  of a and implies  (9 
-  a)  (82 
-  6),  or 
8 —  + a)/2.  In  the risk neutral  case,  the union  makes  a single  take-it 
or leave-it  wage demand.  If  the solution to equation  (6)  ,  say  6+,  is less 
than l' then the union demands l  (the lowest  possible  value of 
profitability)  and there are no strikes.  Otherwise,  the wage demand is 
>  which is accepted  by the firm if 8  > 8, and rejeoted  if 6  < 
resulting  in a strike  of length  1. 
Let m  —  + 
82)/2  represent  the mean of the distribution  of net 
profitability,  let g — (m -  a)/m represent  the proportional  gap between 
expected productivity  at the firm and outside  wages,  and let 
d —  - 
81)/2m 
index  the dispersion  in 910  The condition  for  the 
occurrence  of strikes  can then  be written  as d > 1/3 g,  which is more 
likely,  the greater  the dispersion  in potential  profitability,  and the 
smaller  the average  "rents"  to employment  at the firm.  Assuming that this 
condition is met,  strikes  occur in those  states  with 8 < 8+.  The 
probability  of a work stoppage is just the probability  that  9  < 6+, and can 
be written as 3/4 - g/4d.  For example,  if  g—.  3 and d—.  125 (implying  a 
coefficient  of variation of latent  profitability  of 7.2 pertent) then the 
probability  of strikes  is  .15. 
10The  coefficient  of variation  of 9  is equal to d / sqrt(3).  The 
condition  a C l  implies  that  g > d. 9 
In contrast to the risk neutral  case,  in the risk averse  case the 
first-order  condition  for s(9)  is a function  of s.  Nonetheless,  the 
critical  value of productivity  that  distinguishes  the strike  and no-strike 
states is the same as in the risk-neutral  case.  In  particular,  if 8+ 
satisfies  equation (6) for the risk-neutral  case,  then  s(9+)  — 0  in the 
risk-averse  case.  To see that this is true,  observe that  if s(G4-)  — 0,  then 
s(O) —  0  for all 0  >  94-;  thus  union receipts  are fixed  and u'(r)  is 
constant for all 9  > 9t  It follows that  (9+) —  0  at  —  4- a)/2  is a 
solution to (6) for any value of the risk aversion  parameter  R. 
In the  risk  averse  case,  however, there  is an interval  of realizations 
of productivity (9*  94-)  in which  strike length  is strictly  positive  and 
less than unity.  For any 9 in this interval,  the derivative  of strike 
length  with respect  to 9 may be obtained  by differentiating  the first-order 
condition (6) with respect  to 9.  The result  can be written  as: 
-2 
(7)  s'(9)  — 
2 
R  (9 
-  a) 
yielding the solution 
2  6 
*  (8)  s(9)  =  -  _______ 
R  (9 
-  a)  R  a) 
—  0  9>9+ 
*  —  1  9<9, 
where 9* — max  [  9 
,  a  +  2(92 
- 
a)/(R(92 
- a)  + 4)  J.  This soiutton 
clearly satisfies  the  (ignored)  monotonicity  constraint  on s(O)  and is 
therefore  a solution to the fully specified  problem (4). 10 
As an empirical  matter,  strike  durations  rarely  exceed  one year in 
negotiations  for contracts  over  a two or  three  year term (see Section  II 
below).  In the context of the model,  this suggests  that  workers are 
significantly  risk averse.  Maximum strike  length  is s(1),  which can be 
written  as: 
s(9  ) 
—-——  _L_ 
1  R01  I-p  g1 
where p is the probability  of a dispute  and 
g1 
—  - 
a)/e1 
is the minimum 
proportional  difference  between  the alternative  wage and productivity in 
the firm.11  The term  R  in this  expression  has the interpretation  of the 
index  of relative  risk aversion  at the lowest  wage the firm  will ever pay. 
If the probability  of disputes is  .15 and g1 
— .2,  then the  index  of 
relative  risk aversion  must be at least  3.5 to ensure  strike  durations of 
less than one-half. 
Mean strike  duration  conditional  on a dispute  may be obtained from 
equation (8) by 
9÷ 
E(s  I  a  > 0)  — 




Provided that  maximum strike  duration is less than  unity,  this expression 
can be written  as: 
4  1  1  Id+g  1  1 
P.m  1.  (3d 
-  g)  2(g -  d)  j 
- 
(g + d) 
For example, if g — .3,  d—.125,  and  P.  in  — 4,  then  expected strike  duration 
is .24.  Mean duration is increasing  in the measure  of dispersion  of 
profitability  d, decreasing  in the measure of average  rents  g, and 
111n terms  of the parameters  g and d, g1 
— (g 
- d)/(l  - d). 11 
decreasing  in the index  of risk  aversion  R.  Since  the probability  of 
disputes is also increasing  in  d and decreasing  in  g, this  model implies 
that  changes in the distribution  of profitability  and changes in the 
alternative  wage shift  the probability  and conditional  duration  of disputes 
in the same  direction, 
Expressions  for profits and wages  can be obtained from equation  (3) 
using the incentive  compatibility  constraint  11'(O) —  1  -  s(9).  Assuming 
that maximum strike  length is less than 1,  profits  are given  by 
02-a+4/R  2  9 
11(9) 
6 
=  a 
-  - 
R  log 
[ 
-a 
—  fl(9)  +  (9 
-  G)  2 
For  0 ￿  9, the wage payment  is w(G)  0  -  11(8)/(l  - s(9)).  The maximum 
wage payment is the no-strike  wage 
(9\  2  3d -  g  1  +  lo  [ g- d 
/  1  R  L  g + d  j  R  g 
L  2(g 
-  d) 
while the minimum payment is l  (again,  assuming  that maximum  strike 
duration  is less than 1).  The no-strike  wage is increasing  in  the mean and 
dispersion  of profitability,  and decreasing  in g (holding  constant  the 
distribution  of profitability).  Increases  in  the alternative  wage reduce  g 
and therefore  increase the no-strike  wage.  Increases  in risk aversion,  on 
the other  hand,  lead to lower  wages.  With higher  risk aversion  the union 
is less  willing to forego  wages in relatively  bad states,  implying  that 12 
s(e) is  lower in each state.  As a tesult, tof rease  —ore rapidly 
with the realization  of B and vases Licr'ae  less rapidly  with B. 
The wage concession  schedule  w(a, nay be obtained  by inverting  the 
strike  duration  equation  s(G) and substituting  into  the wage equation.  The 
resulting  expression  is unenlightening but can be shown to be convex  with 
absolute  slope ( -  w)/(l 
-  a).  A useful  and analytically  convenient 
summary  of the concession  schedule is the maximum percentage  wage 
concession: 
w(O) 
- w(l)  -i---  1 io  {  g + d 
1  - 
R  l 
g 
L  2(g  d) j  L  g  + d ] 
1 
This difference  is increasing  in  d, decreasing  in g,  and decreasing  in R. 
To get some idea of the magnitude  of the maximum wage concessions  implied 
by the model,  if d  .125 and g = .3  (implying  a strike  probability  of 
.15), and if the  index  of relative  risk  aversion  at w  m is 4 implying  a 
maximum strike  duration of .5 and a mean duration  of .24), then the gap 
between the no-strike  wage and the wage after the longest  possible strike 
is oniy 1.01 percent.  By comparison,  if workers  were risk neutral they 
would demand  a wage 20.4 percent  above  the minimum realization  of 
productivity  and strike  for the  full period  otherwise. 
In summary,  the signalling  model of strikes  identifies  two important 
determinants  of strike  incidence  and duration:  the dispersion  in 
profitability,  and the gap between alternative  wages and average 
productivity  at the firm.  Increases  in dispersion  of the unobservable 
component  of profitability  increase  the probability  and duration  of 
strikes.  Increases  in the mean level  of productivity  at the firm reduce 13 
the probability  and duration of  strikes,  while increases  in the alternative 
wage decrease  both.  Expected  strike  duration  is also a function  of the 
willingness  of workers to sacrifice  wages during  low-demand  periods in 
return  for higher  wsges in high-demand  periods.  In the model presented 
here,  this  willingness  is captured  by the index  of risk aversion. 
The signalling  model implies  that negotiated  wage rates depend  on the 
same set of exogenous  variables.  Wages  are predicted to increase  with the 
mean and dispersion  of profitability,  and increase  with the alternative 
wage.  Furthermore,  holding constant  these  variables,  wages are a 
decreasing  function  of strike  duration.  Given the range  of empirical 
estimates  of mean and maximum strike  duration,  however, the model suggests 
that the gap between wage settlements  reached  with and without  a work 
stoppage  may be relatively  modest. 
In the following  sections,  these  predictions  are tested  using  a sample 
of labor  contracts  from the Canadian  manufacturing  sector.  I aaauxne  that 
variation  over time in wage rates,  strike  probabilities  and expected strike 
durations  arises from  variation in  the alternative  wage opportunitiea  of 
workers (measured  by regional  unemployment  rates and aggregate  wages 
elsewhere  in the economy)  and variation in  the expected  profitability  of 
the firm (measured  by industry  specific indexes  of output  and selling 
prices).  I first investigate  whether or not there  is any evidence  of a 
negatively  sloped  concession  schedule  between wage settlements  and strike 
duration,  holding constant the observable  determinants  of wages.  The 
existence  of such a schedule  is the most direct  implication  of the 
hypothesis  that strikes  serve  as a mechanism  for price discrimination  among 1". 
12 
more  and  less  profitabe  employers.  I  then investrgate  wnether  the model 
is capable of reconciling  the effects  of the predetermined  variables  on the 
level  of wages  the probability c strikes,  and the conditional  duration  of 
disputes.  The results of both investigations  are relatively  negative. 
There is no evidence  of a systematic  trade-off  between  wages and strike 
duration in the data.  Neither are the effects of industry  output  and 
prices  on wage and strike  outcomes easily  explained  within the confines  of 
the model. 
II.  Data Description  and Measurement  Issues 
This section provides  an overview  of the contract  data used to teit  the 
model  of strikes  developed in the previous  Section.  In  addition,  the 
measure of contractual  wage rates  used in the empirical  analysis is 
introduced  and analyzed. 
lIa.  Sample  Description 
The empirical  analysis in this  paper is based on a sample  of collective 
bargaining  agreements  negotiated  in  the Canadian  manufacturing  sector  from 
1964 to 1985.  The original source  of these  data is the December 1985 
release of Labour Canada's  Wage Tape,  which  contains information  on wage 
rates and other  provisions for 2868 contracts  covering  500 or more 
employees.13  Starting  from this sample,  I have merged together  agreements 
12This  point is emphasized  by McConnell  (1987b) 
l3  am grateful  to Labour  Canada  for supplying  these  data. 
Information  on the methodology  used to collect  and code the data are 
recorded  in the Labour  Canada  publication  Major Wage Settlements  (Appendix 
I). At present, Labour  Canada  collects  data on virtually  all collective 
bargaining  agreements  covering  more than  500 workers. 15 
between  the same firm and union  pair covering  different  establishments)'4 
and eliminated  bargaining  pairs  with fewer than four  consecutive  contracts. 
The final sample  contains  2258 contracts  r.egotiated by 299 distinct  pairs. 
Although the Wage Tape contains  relatively  complete information  on 
contractual  wage rates,  the only strike  information  is an indicator  for the 
stage  at which the agreement  was reached.15 Fortunately,  beginning  and 
ending  dates for disputes involving  more than 100 workers  are reported 
annually in the Labour Canada  publication  Strikes  and Lockouts in Canada 
(jQ).  I therefore  merged  strike  duration  information  from  .  into the 
contract  data set.  A  more complete  description  of the merging process  is 
provided  in the Data Appendix, 
Table I presents a cross-sectional  overview  of the merged  data.  This 
table  gives the number  of bargaining  pairs  and the number  of contracts  from 
each  of 19 two-digit  industries,  as well as the average contract  length, 
base wage rate,  strike  probability,  and strike  duration for each industry. 
The wage rate measure in Table  I  is a simple  average of real wage rates 
prevailing  during the term of the contract)'6 To account for differences 
across  industries  in the yearly  composition  of contract  negotiations,  I 
1'4The  sample  includes 10 separate  contract  chronologies  for General 
Motors and the United  Automobile  Workers, for example.  Each of these 
records  the same  wage rate and strike  information,  but pertains to a 
different  plant or group of plants.  The Data  Appendix describes  the rules 
used for merging contracts. 
15Canadian  labor  law, which varies  somewhat  by province,  requires  the 
bargaining  parties to pass through  one or more stages  of mediation  (or 
"conciliation")  before a strike  or lockout  is declared,  See Canadian 
Department  of Labour (1970)  pp.  135-136. 
16The  average  wage rate is formed  from monthly intracontract  wage 
rates  sampled at six month intervals,  starting  with the effective  month  of 
the contract. 16 
have used a linear  regression  model to adjust  the average  wage rate in each 
contract for  the effective year of  the agreement, 
In the sample as a whole the average  strike  probability  is 22 percent 
and the average strike duration is 54 days.  These averages  are somewhat 
higher  than  corresponding  ones reported  by McConnell  (1987)  for collective 
bargaining  agreements  negotiated  between 1970  and 1981 in  U.S. 
manufacturing  (15 percent and 41 days,  respectively).  The average  strike 
probability  is also higher than the 15.7 percent  average  reported  by 
Gunderson,  Mervin, and Reid (1986)  for a sample  of agreements  from all 
private sector industries  in Canada (including  manufacturing  and non- 
manufacturing  industries). The 22 percent  strike  probability  is virtually 
identical  to the rate of disputes  among all manufacturing  contracts 
recorded  on the Wage Tape between 1964  and 1985, however. 
Average strike  probabilities  vary substantially  by industry  within 
manufacturing,  ranging from less than 10 percent in tobacco,  clothing,  and 
printing industries,  to over 30 percent in wood products  and transportation 
industries.  Mean and median  strike  duration  also  vary by industry,  with 
the shortest strikes in clothing industries  and the longest  ones in paper 
and petroleum  refining.18  Strike  probability  and duration  are virtually 
uncorrelated across  two-digit  industries  (the rank-order  correlation  is 
.08).  There is a very weak rank-order  correlation  between the average 
17The  industry  averages  represent  estimated  industry  coefficients  from 
a linear  regression  of the average contract  real  wage (in 1981  dolLars) on 
industry  dummy variables  and dummy  variables  representing  the effective 
year of the contract.  The year effects  are normalized  to sum to zero. 
18Data  for the petroleum  refining  industry  must be interpreted 
carefully,  since there  is only one bargaining  pair (with one strike)  from 
this industry in the sample. 17 
strike  probability  and the average  base  wage rate in the  industry  (10). 
The average real  wage rate in the industry  is more strongly  correlated  with 
average  strike  duration (the rank-order  correlation  is .29). 
Table  2 summarizes  the time-series  characteristics  of the sample. 
This table  reports average contract  lengths,  wage rates, strike 
probabilities,  and strike  durations  by the effective  year of the bargaining 
agreement.  As in Table 1, the real  wage rate for each contract is measured 
as an average of prevailing  wage rates during  the  term  of the contract. 
For ease of comparison  across  years, the average  wage rate for each year is 
adjusted  for the two-digit  industry  composition  of settlements  in that 
19 
year. 
Average real  wage rates show a secular  growth  rate of approximately 
three  percent per year from  1964 to 1977.  Thereafter,  the growth  rate is 
erratic  and much slower.  Strike  probabilities  and durations  show  no 
particular  trend,  although strike  incidence  was relatively  high in the 
early  1970's.  The rank-order  correlation  across  years between real  wage 
rates  (adjusted  for industry  composition)  and strike  incidence  is - .07. 
The correlation  over time  between average strike  duration and average 
strike  probability  is essentially  zero. 
More information  on the distribution  on strike  durations is provided in 
Figure 1,  which displays  the estimated  daily  settlement  rate  (or hazard 
19  . 
The  average  wages  in  Table  2  represent  estimated  year effects from a 
linear  regression  of the average real  wage rate for each contract  on year 
effects and 2-digit industry  effects.  The  industry  effects  are normalized 
to sum to zero. 18 
20 
rate)  among ongoing  strises.  The figure  is cased  on the set of 477 
strikes for which  complete duration  information  is available.  After 140 
days,  some 39 strikes (8 percent of the sample)  were still in  progress. 
Only two strikes in the sample  lasted  longer  than  one year:  one  for 379 
days,  and one for 598 days.  The average settlement  rate in the first  140 
days  is  1.8 percent  per day,  or 12 percent  per week.  The settlement  rate 
is slightly  higher for the first  2 weeks  of strike  duration (2.4  percent 
per day),  and also shows a relative  peak between 45 and 50 days. 
Otherwise,  the settlement  rate  is relatively  constant.  This finding  of a 
roughly  constant hazard  rate is similar  to the finding in Card (1988) for a 
sample  of strikes among  U.S.  manufacturing  contracts.  Other recent  studies 
based on broader samples of strikes have suggested that  the settlement  rate 
declines (Kennan  (1980) or rises (Harrison  and Stewart  (1986))  with the 
duration  of the dispute. 
lib.  Measurement  of Contract  Wage Rates 
Any analysis  of wage outcomes  among  collective  bargaining  agreements 
requires  some  measure of the wage rate associated  with each settlement. 
Multi-year  labor contracts,  however,  typically  specify  a schedule  of wage 
rates  over the life  of the contract.  For example,  most three-year 
contracts  contain deferred  wage-change  provisions  that increase  nominal 
wage rates  on the first  and second  anniversary  dates  of the contract.  In 
addition,  indexed contracts  contain cost-of-living  allowance (C01.A) clauses 
20The estimated  settlement  rate is constructed  from  daily settlements 
for strikes of 1-60 days duration,  and from settlements  over 2 day 
intervals (expressed  at a daily  rate)  for strikes  of 60-140  days duration. 19 
that link quarterly,  semi-annual,  or annual  increases  to changes  in the 
consumer  price index. 
Figure 2 illustrates  the  intra-contract  evolution  of real wage rates  in 
three  major subsamples  of contracts:  two-year  non-indexed  contracts;  three- 
year non-indexed  contracts;  and three-year  indexed contracts.21 The 
underlying  data are recorded in  Appendix Table  1.  As the figure  shows, 
real  wage rates typically  move in a narrow  corridor  over the life  of the 
contract.  Among three-year  contracts (both  indexed  and non-indexed),  the 
average change  in real  wage rates  from the beginning  to the end of the 
contract  was about -l percent.  Among two-year  non-indexed  contracts,  by 
comparison,  the average  change  was about -4 percent. The more rapid  erosion 
of real  wage rates  among two-year  as compared  to three-year  non-indexed 
contracts  reflects the higher average  annual rate of inflation  among  the 
former  group (6.5 percent versus 5.1 percent).  The average inflation  rate 
was even higher among  the sample  of three-year  indexed contracts  (7.2 
percent  per year),  but the effect  on real  wage rates  was offset  by the 
escalation  provisions  in these  contracts. 
One natural summary  measure of the wage provisions  in a multi-year 
labor  contract is the average real  wage rate during  the term of the 
contract.  The real wage rates reported  in Tables  1 and 2 are of this form, 
with the averages taken  over wage rates  measured  at six-month intervals. 
Except in  very rare instances,  however,  real wage rates  during the term of 
21The  sample  contains 728 non-indexed  contracts  with durations  between 
23 and 25 months, 355 non-indexed  contracts  with durations  between 35 and 
37 months, and 381  indexed  contracts  with durations  between 35 and 37 
months. Together, these  three groups  make up 65 percent of the contract 
sample. 20 
the contract  are not set directly  by the bargaining  parties22  Rather  the 
parties specify a schedule  of nominal wage increases  and,  in the case of an 
escalated  contract,  a partial indexation  formula.  This suggests  that  an 
average of expected real  wage rates is a more appropriate  ex ante summary 
of the wage provisions  in a long-term  collective  bargaining  agreement.23 
Unfortunately,  expected  real  wage rates  are not directly  observable 
and must be inferred  from the nominal  wage provisions  of the collective 
bargaining  agreement  and some  measure  of expected  prices.  To see the 
nature  of the measurement  problem,  let w(m) represent  the logarithm  of the 
* 
real  wage rate during  month  m of the contract,  and let w  (m)  represent  the 
parties'  expectation  of w(m) as of the negotiation  date of the contract. 
In a non-indexed  contract,  the actual  real  wage rate is related to the 
expected rate  by 
*  * 
(9)  w(m) —  w  (m) 
-  (p(m) 
-  p  (m)), 
where p(m)  is the logarithm  of the price level in month  m and p*(m)  is the 
parties' expectation  of p(m).  In an escalated  contract  with an indexation 
formula that increases  nominal  wages by e percent for each  percent increase 
*  in prices,  w(m) and w (m) are related  by: 
*  * 
(10)  w(m) —  w  (m) 
-  (l-e)(p(m) 
-  p  (m)). 
Most escalated  labor  contracts,  however,  do not specify a fixed  elasticity 
of indexation.  Instead,  they  specify  a fixed  absolute increase  in wages 
22The  only case in which intra-contract  real  wage rates  are set 
directly is that of an indexed  contract  in which nominal  wage rates 
increase  at the same proportional  rate as the aggregate  price index. 
Indexation  formulas  of this type are extremely  rare:  see Card (1983). 
23Th1s  measure of wage rates was first  proposed  by McConnell (1987b). 
Figure  2 also suggests  that the real wage at the start  of the contract may 
be a useful summary  of contractual  wages.  The empirical  results in this 
paper are unchanged  when this simple  summary  measure is used. 21 
for each point increase  in the consumer  price index.  In addition,  some 
escalated  contracts  restrict the range  of price increases  covered by 
indexation,  either  by limiting  the maximum  escalated  wage increase,  or by 
specifying  a trigger price level  that  must be reached  before indexation 
begins.24  In such contracts,  the elasticity  of indexation  varies  over the 
contract,  and may in fact  be zero for a range of price increases. 
Nonetheless,  equation (10>  is approximately  correct  for an interval  of 
* 
realized prices  around  p  (a), where  e i  defined  as the elasticity  of 
* 
indexation  at p—p (m). 
Given an estimate  of the parties'  expected  price level  in month  m, 
(m), and an estimate  of e, say ,  an  estimate  of  the expected real  wage 
rate in month m is 
(11) (m) — w(m) + (l-)(p(m)  - 
*  *  * 
w  (m) 
-  (e-e)(p(m) 
-  p  (m)) + (l-e)(p(m) 
-  p  (a)). 
This equation  makes  clear that there  are two sources  of error in the 
measurement  of expected real  wage rates:  errors in the measurement  of e 
(which  arise  only in  the case of an indexed  contract);  and errors in the 
measurement  of expected future  prices. 
In this paper I estimate the elasticity  of indexation  by the ratio  of 
total  escalated  wage increases  over the life  of the contract (in percentage 
terms)  to the total  increase  in prices  over the life of the contract.  This 
estimator  has the advantage  that it does not require  detailed information 
on the cost-of-living  escalation  formula in  the contract.25 On the other 
24See Card (1983)  for a description  of escalation  provisions  among 
indexed  contracts  written in Canada from  1968-75. 
25Detailed  information  on COLA formulas  is not available  on the Wage 
Tape. 22 
hand,  it introduces  some inaccuracy  into the calculation  of expected real 
wage rates, particularly  for contracts  with restricted  escalation 
clauses.26  I also use simple  autoregressive  models  of the consumer  price 
index  to form estimates  of the expected  price level  during  the contract 
period. 
Table 3 compares  alternative  measures  of the contractual  wage provisions 
for the overall contract  sample  and for the subsamples  of indexed  and non- 
indexed  agreements.  The upper panel  of the table reports means and standard 
deviations  of three  wage measures:  the average  real wage rate during  the 
term of the contract (formed from monthly intra-contract  wage rates  sampled 
at 6-month intervals)  and two averages  of expected intra-contract  real 
wage rates (again, based on monthly wage rates  sampled at 6-month 
intervals).  The averages  of expected  wage rates  differ  by the model  used 
to forecast  future  price increases.  In the first  case (referred  to in  the 
table  as forecast  method  I) future  prices  are estimated  from a model that 
predicts the one-month  ahead  inflation  rate  using a constant  and the 
average inflation  rate over the previous 12  months.  The coefficients  of 
this forecasting  model are obtained  from a regression  equation  estimated 
over the 1954-85  period.27  In the second  case (referred  to in the table  as 
26For  example, an escalation  clause  with a trigger  formula  may have 
generated  no increase in  wages in a contract  for which actual  price 
increases  were smaller than  expected.  Thus the estimate  of e  is zero,  even 
though  the elasticity  of indexation  may have been non-zero  for prices close 
to the expected  price level. 
27The fitted  equation  is DP 




change  in the logarithm  of the consumer  price index  during  the current 
month (at an annual  rate),  and DPl2t is the change in the logarithm  of the 
consumer  price index over the previous 12 months.  This equation  generates 
a  forecast for the rate  of change  in prices  over the next 36 months,  for 
example,  of .026 + .6135  DPl2. 23 
forecast  method 2) future  price increases  are estimated  from a model that 
predicts the one-month  ahead  inflation  rate  using the lagged  monthly 
inflation  rate,  the monthly inflation  rate 12 months  ago, and an estimated 
constant and trend.28  The coefficients  of this forecasting  equation  are 
estimated  from  monthly data for the 10 years prior to the year in which the 
forecast is made.29 Forecasts  from the second  method  are therefore  based  on 
data that  were available  to the bargaining  parties at the time of their 
negotiations. 
The lower  panel of Table 3 gives  means and standard  deviations  of the 
forecast  errors  in average  wage rates associated  with the two  forecasting 
methods.  The mean forecast  errors  for both methods  are essentially  zero. 
In all  three  samples,  however, the standard  deviations  of the forecast 
errors for the first forecasting method  are lower.  This is apparently  due 
to the fact that the forecasts  from the second  method,  which are based on a 
series  of sliding regressions  with linear  trend  terms,  tend to "over-shoot' 
major turning  points in  the  inflationary  process.30 
28Thjs  model seems  to perform best among the class  of models  that 
forecast  monthly inflation  rates  using the monthly  rates in the previous 12 
months. 
comparison  of the estimated  autoregressive  coefficients from 
various subsamples  of the 1954-85  period revealed  that these  coefficients 
are remarkably  stable  over time.  On the other  hand,  the estimated  constant 
and trend terms  in the equation  vary significantly  over time.  In view of 
this fact,  I restricted  the autoregressive  coefficients  to be the same in 
the forecasting  equations  for the various  subsarnples. The fitted 
forecasting  equations  therefore  have the form: 
DI'  — constant ÷ trend  + .2154  DP 
1 
+  .3437  DP 
12  where 
DPt s  the change in the logarithm f  the consumer  rLce  index in 
month t, and the estimated  constant  and trend  terms  vary by sample  perIod. 
30For example,  the two-year ahead  inflationary  forecast for January 
1976 is 8.38  by the first  method,  and 10.56 by the second  method.  The 
actual  rate of change  of prices  over the period  was 7.28 percent per year. 26 
lila.  Models  of Contractual  Wage Ra 
As a first  step toward  an empirical  teat of the signalling  model of 
strikes, this section  specifies  a number  of alternative  statistical  models 
for the wage measures introduced  above.  I first  estimate  a components-of- 
variance model of wages that includes  bargaining-pair  effects as well as 
market-level  determinants  of wages, including  unemployment  rates and 
measures of industry  demand.  I next investigate  the effects  of real wage 
movements  during the preceding  contract  on subsequent  wage rates.  These 
models are then  used in  the following  section  to test the existence  of a 
negatively sloped  concession  schedule  between wages  and strike  duration. 
To begin the analysis  of negotiated  wage rates, consider the following 
components-of-variance  model of the expected  average  wage rate associated 
with the  contract  negotiated  by the  bargaining  pair: 
(12)  w.  —  a.  +  X.  .b  + u.., 
where w.  represents  the parties'  expected  average  wage rate,  a. 
represents  a pair-specific  effect,  X..  represents  a vector  of variables 
influencing  the desired  wage rate,  and u.. represents  a pair-  and contract- 
specific idiosyncratic  component.  The pair effect a  absorbs any permanent 
pair-specific  variation in  wage rates,  such as that associated  with 
industry  or region  effects, or the skill-level  of workers.  In addition,  a. 
absorbs any variation  across  pairs associated  with the choice  of base wage 
rates to represent  the contract.31 
31Most  manufacturing  contracts  cover a  wide range  of skill  levels, 
from  janitors and unskilled  production  workers to skilled  maintenance 
mechanics.  The use of a base wage rate to measure  the level of wages in a 
contract presumes that  relative  wage differentials  within  the contract are 
held constant.  In comparing  base wage rates across  different  contracts, 25 
The measured expected  average  wage rate  differs from the parties' 
expected  wage rate  by an error 
(13)  w..  —  w... + . 
13  13  13 
Following  equation (11),  Consists  of an average of terms involving 
differences  between actual  and measured indexation  elasticities,  and actual 
and measured price expectations.  Equations (12) and (13) imply  that 
measured expected  average  wage rates foLlow 
(14)  a'..  —  a.  +  X.  .b  +  u..  +  c.,. 
13  1  13  13  13 
The error component  in this equation  represents  a combination  of 
measurement  error and the contract-specific  idiosyncratic  effect. 
A convenient  method  of handling  the pair effect  a. in equation (14) is 
to difference  over consecutive  contracts,  yielding 
(15)  b...  ..  -  ..  4X. .b  +  4u..  +  4g.., 
13  13  ij-l  13  13  13 
Provided that  X  does  not contain  any lagged  dependent  variables  this 
equation can  be estimated  by ordinary  least  squares over the subsample  of 
second  and later  contracts  for each  bargaining  pair.  Unfortunately, 
differencing  introduces  a first-order  moving  average  error component  into 
the observations  from a given  bargaining  pair,  rendering  conventional  OLS 
standard errors  inconsistent.  Consistent  standard  errors  can be estimated 
by a two-step procedure  that  accounts for the residual  correlation  between 
consecutive  contracts  for each  bargaining  pair.32 
however, wage variation  may arise if the base  wage in one contract  refers 
to a very low-skilled  group,  while  the base wage in another refers  to a 
more highly-skilled  group. 
32  See Holtz-Eakin,  Newey, and Rosen (1986)  for a more complete 
discussion. 26 
Some preliminary  estimates  of equation  (15) are presented  in Table  4 
for the two alternative  measures  of the expected  average wage rate 
introduced  above.  Included  in the Vector  X are variables  representing  the 
state of the labor  market  at the effective  date  of the contract (the 
seasonally-adjusted  province-specific  monthly  unemployment  rate33  the 
average monthly real  wage rate in all manufacturing) variables measuring 
the state  of demand  faced  by the employer  in the effective  year of the 
contract (the  3-digit industry  selling  price index, deflated  by the 
consumer  price index,  and 3-digit  industry  output),  and trend  terms or year 
effects. Sources  for these  variables  are described  in the Data  Appendix. 
In order to assure that  data is available  for at least  two preceding 
contract  negotiations,  the equations  are estimated  over the subsample  of 
third  and later  contracts  for each bargaining  pair.  Furthermore,  since 
data on industry  selling  prices  and output  are unavailable  after 1983,  and 
provincial  unemployment  rates  are unavailable  before  1966,  the sample  is 
restricted  to agreements  with effective  dates  between  1966 and 1983.  The 
resulting  subsample  contains 1467 contracts  negotiated  by 298 bargaining 
-  34 
pairs. 
Columns (1) and (5) of Table  4 present  estimates  of equation (15) with 
linear  and quadratic trend  terms.  These  equations  also contain a dummy 
variable for contracts  with effective  dates  between  1976 and 1978.  During 
this period,  wage and price increases  were regulated  by a federal agency 
33 
Provincial  unemployment  rates are only  available  for the three 
largest  provinces 
-- British Columbia,  Ontario,  and Quebec.  For the 
remaining  provinces I use the national  rate. 
34The  average strike  probability  among  this subsample  is 21.98 
percent.  The mean and median  strike  duration  are 57.1 and 40 days, 
respectively. 27 
known as the Anti-Inflation  Board (AIB).  The estimation  results  are not 
particularly  strong:  the estimated  coefficients  vary  between the two 
alternative  specifications  of expected  wage rates,  and are mostly 
statistically  insignificant.  The only robust finding  is a negative  effect 
of wage controls on real  wage rates.35 
In columns (2) and (6), the  trend  terms  and AIB dummy  variable are 
replaced  by an unrestricted  set of year-effects  for the effective  year of 
the contract.  This change  in specification  significantly  improves  the fit 
of the equations, and also reduces  the discrepancies  between  the 
alternative  wage measures.  In particular,  the coefficients  of the 
provincial  unemployment  rate and the industry  selling  price  index are 
reasonably  well-determined  and of similar  magnitude in the two equations. 
Neither the manufacturing  wage rate  nor industry  output  have large  effects 
in either  equation. 
These simple  specifications  exclude any information  on the evolution  of 
real wage rates  during the previous  contract.  The evidence  in the micro- 
wage determination  literature,  however, suggests  that real  wage changes 
during the preceding  contract  exert  a major influence  on subsequent  wage 
determination.  Both Riddell (1979) and Christofides  et. al.  (l9BOa,  1980b). 
for example,  find that  unexpected  price increases  over the term  of the 
previous contract lead  to incomplete catch-up" increases  in the following 
contract.  In terms  of real  wage rates,  their  results  imply  that unexpected 
real wage reductions  during  the preceding  contract  lead to lower  real wage 
rates in the subsequent  one.  A simple  way of incorporating  this 
35For a review of the evidence  on the effects of the AIB on Canadian 
wage settlements,  see Riddell (1986). 28 
possibility  into  equation (12) is to introduce  a term representing  the 
difference  between  the actual  real  wage at the end of the previous 
c:ntract,  w(T)ji 
and the parties'  expectation  of this  wage rate 
w (T).1: 
*  * 
(16)  w..  a.  +  X.  .b  +  c  (w(T).. 
- w  (T)..  )  +  u... 
1]  1  13  13-1  13-1  13 
If the parameter  c is positive then  unexpectedly  high or low real wage 
rates at the end of the previous contract  carry  over into  the next 
contract.  If c is zero then there  is complete "catch-up"  for unexpected 
inflation  over the previous contract.36 
Equation (16) may be combined  with the measurement  model (13) and 
differenced. over  consecutive  contracts  to  yield: 
(17) do..  —  dX. .b 
13  13 
+  c  {  (w(T)..1 
- 3(T)..1) 
-  (w(T)..2 
- 
+  du..  + dE..  + c 
13  13  13-1 
where s(T)..1  represents  the measurement  error in the expected  real wage 
rate at the end of the i_let contract  for the th  pair.  Since this error is 
positively  correlated  with the measured expected  wage at the end of the 
contract,  an instrumental  variables scheme is required  to obtain consistent 
estimates  of equation (17).  An obvious instrument  for the first-difference 
of the forecast  error in ending  real wage rates  is the first  difference  of 
the change  in consumer prices  over the term of the previous contract. 
Columns  (3) and (7) of Table 4 contain  estimates  of (17) obtained in 
this  manner.  The point estimates  of the coefficient  c are very similar for 
36By "complete  catch-up",  I mean that  real  wage rates  are restored to 
their  expected level  at the end of the previous  contract.  This is 
equivalent  to a coefficient  of unity  on the nominal wage catch-up term 
specified  by Riddell (1979). 29 
the two specification  of expected  real  wage rates,  and are highly 
significant  in each case.  These estimates  suggest  that an unexpected  real 
wage reduction  of one percent during  the last  contract leads  to a .4 
percent reduction in real  wages in  the next contract.  The addition  of the 
forecast  error in the ending  wage rate of the previous contract  also leads 
to larger  point estimates  of the effect  of unemployment  on expected  real 
wage rates.  As in columns  (2) and (6), industry  output  and average  wages 
in manufacturing  continue  to have small and statistically  insignificant 
effects on negotiated  wage rates. 
While equation (16) permits  unexpected  real wage changes during  the 
last  contract to affect  subsequent  real  wage rates,  it is also possible 
that expected  wages in the last  contract  affect  future rates.  To pursue 
this idea  further, suppose 
(18)  w.  - a.  +  X..b  + c (w(T).1 
- w*(T)i.1) 
+  dw..  +  u,,. 
13  13 
The coefficient  d captures  any state-dependence  in expected  wages,  This 
mode],  can be combined  with the measurement  model (13) and differenced  to 
yield: 
(19) '..  —  X. .b 
13  13 
+  c  (  (w(T).1 
- (T)..1) 
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Notice that the lagged  dependent  variable is correlated  with the residual 
component  for two reasons:  first,  because of the negative  correlation  of 
and au..;  and second,  because of the positive correlation  of .  ij-l  13  13'i 
and  Furthermore,  as in equation (18),  the lagged  forecast  error in 30 
the ending  wage rate is correlated  with  (T)1 
.  Thus  instrumental 
variables  are  required  for  both  the  lagged  dependent  variable,  and  the 
first-difference  of the forecast  error  of ending  real wage rates. 
Potential  instruments  include  the components  of  and the first- 
difference  of the change in consumer  prices  over the last  contract. 
Estimates  of equation (11) are presented  in columns (4) and (8) of 
Table 4.  The  results suggest that  both lagged  expected  wages and the 
forecast  error  in the ending  wage rate of the previous  contract  affect 
current  wages,  although the precise  effects  of these  two variables  differ 
somewhat  depending  on the specification  of expectations,  The coefficients 
of the other exogenous  variables are not much different  across the two 
specifications.  An over-identification  test for the validity  of the 
exclusion  restrictions  implicit  in the instrumental  variables  estimation 
scheme  (reported  in row 10 of the table) suggests that these  restrictions 
are roughly consistent  with the data when price  expectations  are formed  by 
the first forecasting  method, but are less  consistent  when prices are 
forecast  by the second  method.37 
Ilib.  The Effects of Strike  Outcomes  on Contract  Wages 
Starting from the model of contractual  wages represented  by equation 
(19),  this  section presents  estimates  of the effects  of strike incidence 
and duration on negotiated  wage rates. The objective  is to identify  the 
37The over-identification  test is a test for the orthogonality  of the 
residuals  of the estimated  equation  with the instrumental  variables:  see 
Newey (1985) for a fuller  discussion.  The statistic  is asymptotically 
distributed  as chi-square  with degrees  of freedom  equal to the degree  of 
over-identification:  18 in the case of the models in columns (4) and (8)  of 
table  4. 31 
partial correlation  between  wages and strike  outcomes,  holding constant  the 
observable  determinants  of  wages.  The existence  of a negatively  sloped 
concession  schedule is a major  prediction  of the signalling  model  outlined 
in Section  I.  More generally,  however, the existence  of a trade-off 
between wages and contemporaneous  strike  outcomes is an important 
ingredient  of many alternative  models of strike  activity.38 
Table S reports a variety of alternative  specifications  of the effects 
of strikes on wages, using the two alternative  measures of expected  real 
wage rates introduced  in Tables  3 and 4.  All regressions  in the table 
include  an unrestricted  set of year effects for the effective  year of the 
contract,  as well as the provincial  unemployment  rate,  the real industry 
selling price index,  the forecast  error in the real wage rate at the end of 
the preceding  contract,  and a  lagged  dependent  variable.  The equations  are 
estimated  by two-stage  least  squares,  using lagged  year effects, the lagged 
national  unemployment  rate,  and the lagged  change  in consumer  prices  during 
the term  of the contract as instrumental  variables for the lagged  dependent 
variable  and the forecast  error in the ending  wage rate  of the last 
39 
contract. 
Columns (1) and (5) of Table  5  present  wage determination  equations 
that include  a variable measuring  the duration  of any work stoppage.40 
Columns  (2) and (6) present  equations  with a simple  indicator  variable  for 
38For  example, the sequential  bargaining  models of Tracy (1986) and 
Fudenburg,  Levine,  and Ruud (1985) give many of the same predictions  as the 
signalling  model.  The Ashenfelter  Johnson (1969)  model  also  assumes a 
negative relation  between wages  and strike  duration. 
39As in table  4, these  variables  are all used in first-difference  form. 
40For contracts  settled  without a work stoppage,  strike  duration is 
equal to zero. 32 
whether the settlement  was reached  following  a strike.  The results  are 
unsupportive  of any systematic  relation  between  wages and strike  outcomes. 
Neither strike  duration  nor incidence  is significantly  related to the 
expected  average real wage,  holding  constant  the other  determinants  of 
wages.41  The sign of the estimated  coefficient  of strike  duration  varies 
by the forecasting  method  for expected future  prices,  while the estimated 
coefficients  of the strike  incidence  variable  are both small and positive. 
I have also  experimented  with alternative  normalizations  of strike 
duration, including  strike  duration as a fraction  of average industry 
contract length,  and as a fraction  of the duration  of the previous 
contract,  Neither of these  normalizations  has any effect  on the results. 
These estimated  correlations  must be interpreted  very carefully  since 
they  may be biased by unobserved  variation  in factors  that affect  both the 
negotiated  wage rate and the probability  and duration  of work stoppages. 
In particular,  in the framework  of a signalling  model the estimated 
correlation  of strikes  and wages may be positively  biased  by failure  to 
control for variation in the alternative  wage opportunities  of workers. 
Unmeasured  variation in the expected  profitability  of the firm,  by 
comparison,  introduces  a negative  bias into the estimated  correlation  of 
strikes and wages.  If a signalling  model  based on unobserved  profitability 
is correct,  however, and the true correlation  of wages and strike  duration 
is negative, then the results in columns  (l)-(2)  and (5)-(6)  suggest that 
4'The raw correlations  between  the first-difference  of the expected 
average real wage rate and the first-difference  of strike incidence  and 
duration are also approximately  zero. 33 
unobserved  variation in alternative  wages is the more likely  source  of 
42  bias. 
Columns  (3)-(4)  and (7)-(8)  introduce  two additional  variables  to help 
control  for unobserved  variation  in alternative  wage opportunities.  The 
first  of these  is the actual strike  frequency  among  settlements  in the rwo 
months  prior to the effective  month  of the current  negotiation.43  This 
variable  controls for any unobservable  sources  of variation  in aggregate 
strike  probabilities,  including  changes in aggregate-level  alternative  wage 
opportunities  or employment  probabilities.  The second  variable is an 
indicator  for wildcat strikes during  the term of the previous  agreement.44 
There is some evidence that intra-contract  dispute  rates  are influenced  by 
labor  market conditions,45 Thus the introduction  of an indicator  for 
wildcat disputes  during the last contract  helps to control for any 
contract-specific  variation in local labor market conditions  that might 
otherwise  bias the estimated  correlation  of wage rates and strike  outcomes. 
The results in columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8)  suggest that there  is indeed 
positive  correlation  between  wages and strike  duration could  also 
be generated  by changes in the union's  assessment  of the dispersion  of 
unobserved  profitability. Tracy's (1986,  1987)  idea  of using the 
variability  of security  price  returns could  in principle  be used to try and 
measure  changes in the latter,  for the subset  of publicly traded  firms  in 
the sample. 
43This  probability  is estimated from  monthly  strike  probabilities 
among  the entire sample  of 2258 contracts. 
use the term "wildcat"  to refer to strikes during  the term of an 
existing  agreement.  Information  on wildcat disputes  was collected from 
Strikes  and Lockouts in Canada,  and is only available  for disputes 
involving  100 or more workers.  The fraction  of agreements  with at least 
one wildcat walkout during the previous  contract  is 7.7 percent.  The 
typical  duration  of these  disputes  is 1-3 days. 
45  . 
Flaherty  (1983) finds that the annual  number of wildcat strikes in 
U.S.  manufacturing  is highly correlated  with the unemployment  rate. 34 
a positive  correlation  between wage settlements  and uuobserved  factors  that 
contribute  toward  higher strike  probabilities, The estimated  coefficients 
of the aggregate  strike  probability  in row 7.  are positive  and marginally 
significant  in every  case.  The estimated  coefficients  of the  indicator  for 
wildcat disputes during  the previous  contract  are much closer to zero.  The 
introduction  of these  two control  variables,  however, does  not have much 
effect  on the estimated  relation  between  wage settlements  and strike 
outcomes.  There is still  no evidence  of any systematic  effect  of strike 
incidence  or duration on negotiated  wage rates. 
Some further evidence  of the effects of strike  duration  on wages is 
summarized  in Table 6.  This table reports  the estimated  wage effects  of 
strikes  in four  broad duration  classes  for the two different  specifications 
of expected real  wages.46  The duration  classes  correspond  roughly to the 
quartiles  of the distribution  of strike  lengths  in the sample.  Overall, 
the results in Table 6 support  the conclusion  from  Table 5 that there is no 
strong  or systematic  relation  between wage rates  and strikes.  The largest 
estimated  wage effect  is associated  with strikes  of 45-89  days:  strikes in 
this category  are estimated to increase  expected  average real  wage rates  by 
.7 percent (with  a standard error  of .4 percent). 
In an effort  to check the robustness  of these  findings,  I have also fit 
the specifications  in Table 6 to subsamples  of the 1966-83  period,  and to 
subsets of contracts  from specific  two-digit  industries.  Some  of the 
results are summarized in Appendix Table  2.  The estimated strike  incidence 
and duration effects  are stable  across  different  sample  periods and 
46Although  they are not reported  in the table,  the estimated 
coefficients  of the other  variables in the regressions  are very similar to 
the estimates  in columns  (4) and (8) of Table  5. 35 
different  industries.  In none  of the subsamples  are the estimated  strike 
effects large  or statistically  significant.  The estimates  of the other 
coefficients  in the wage determination  model are also very similar  across 
the various subsamples.  The only exception  is the estimated  effect  of the 
provincial  unemployment  rate,  which is weakly  positive in the 1966-75 
sample  period,  but strongly  negative in the 1976-83  period.47  The 
estimated  effects of the industry  selling  price index,  by comparison,  are 
very similar in the two sample  periods. 
The results of this analysis  are not particularly  supportive  of the 
signalling  interpretation  of strikes,  or indeed  of any model that  predicts 
a systematic  relation  between  wages  and strikes,  Controlling  for the year 
of the contract  negotiation,  wage rates  in the previous  contract,  and 
measures of unemployment  and industry  selling  prices,  there is no 
significant  correlation  between  wages and strikes.  This conclusion  seems 
robust  to the choice  of sample  definition.  Although the theoretically- 
predicted  negative  correlation  may be obscured  by variation  in alternative 
wages that raises  the negotiated  wage rate and increases  the probability 
and duration  of disputes,  the attempt to control  for this  variation  using 
dispute rates in other  recent  contracts  and a measure of wildcat strikes 
during the previous contract  was unsuccessful, 
The finding that  wages are uncorrelated  with strike  durations  differs 
sharply  from the recent  results  of McConnell (l987b),  who finds  that  wages 
are significantly  negatively  related to strike  durations in a  broad sample 
of collective  bargaining  agreements  from the U.S.  In  contrast,  Lacroix 
This accords  with the findings  of Christofides  et.  al. (1980a, 
1980b),  who estimate  nominal wage change  equations  on contracts  from the 
1964-75  period, and generally  fail to find any systematic  effect  of unemployment 36 
(1986) has also reported  a negligible  correlation  between strike  oUtcOmes 
and  wages,  using a sample  of Canadian  contracts  derived from the same 
source  as the sample  in this paper.  Lacroix's  results  are particularly 
interesting  because  he is also  able to reproduce  the earlier finding  of a 
positive correlation  between wages and strikes  reported  by  Riddell (1980) 
Lacroix shows that this  positive correlation  is an artifact  of the 
treatment  of time effects in the wage determination  model.  Since 
McConnell's  estimating  equations  include unrestricted  year effects, 
however, this  cannot  explain the discepancy  between her results  and those 
presented  here and by Lacroix. 
Nevertheless,  in interpreting  these results  it is important  to keep in 
mind that the size of the wage strike  tradeoff  predicted  by the  theoretical 
model is small.  Strike  durations  are short relative to the period of time 
covered  by typical labor  contracts.  Given  this fact,  the signalling  model 
implies  a relatively  small  gap between  wages reached  with and without  a 
work stoppage:  on the order  of 1 percent.  The estimates in Tables  5 and 6 
generally  do not rule out such  a gap. 
IV.  Determinants  of Strike  Incidence  and Duration 
This section  turns to an investigation  of the determinants  of strike 
incidence  and duration in the contract  sample.  According to the model 
presented in Section  I, the same predetermined  variables  affect  wage rates 
and the probability  and intensity  of strike  activity.  Furthermore, 
variables that  have a positive effect  on wages  via their  effect  on the 
profitability  of the firm should  decrease  the probability  and conditional 
duration of work stoppages,  while  variables  that  have a positive effect  on 
wages  via their effect  on the alternative  wage opportunities  of workers 37 
should  increase the probability  and duration of  disputes.  Thus a 
comparison  of the effects of the pre-determined  variables in the wage 
equations  with their  effects in the strike  incidence  and duration  equations 
provides further evidence  on the empirical  relevance  of the signalling 
model of strikes. 
IVa,  Models of Strike  Incidence 
Table 7 reports  estimates  of two alternative  statistical  models  of 
strike incidence.  The first  of these is a first-differenced  version of the 
linear  probability  model.  According to this  model,  the probability  of a 
work stoppage in the th  negotiation  of the id" bargaining  pair (p..)  is 




where . represents a pair-specific  fixed  effect  and X..  represents  a 
vector of pre-determined  variables.  This model suffers  from the criticism 
that p 
may fall outside  the unit interval.  Nonetheless,  (20) is a 
convenient  model for panel  data because it implies  a simple  linear 
regression  for the first-difference  of measured strike  incidence: 
(21)  dy..  —  dx. . +  d.  -. 
13  13  13 
th  .  .  . th  where y.. equals 1 if a strike  occurred in the j  negotiation  of the  i 
pair,  and 0 otherwise,  and .. has  the interpretation  of a zero-mean 
48  residual.  Estimates  of this  equation are presented  in the first  4 
columns of Table 7, for the same sample  of observations  used to generate 
tables  4-6.  The elements of X include  the seasonally  adjusted  monthly 
48The residual term  d.. in equation (21)  is conditionally 
heteroskedastic  and exhibits3negative  first-order  serial  correlation.  The 
estimated  standard errors  in Table 7 account for both these  features. 38 
provincial  unemployment  rate (measured  in the effective  month of the 
contract),  the real industry  selling  price of the appropriste  3-digit 
industry  (measured  in  the effettive  year of the contract),  the forecast 
error in the ending  real  wage rate of the preceding  contract,  the expected 
average real  wage rate  during  the preceding  contract,  and an indicator  for 
any wildcat strikes  during the previous  contract.  Expected  real  wages are 
formed  using the first  price forecaating  method described  in the last 
section.  Results using  the second  method  are very similar,  and ara not 
reported  here. 
The first two columns  of the table  report  estimates  of equation (21) 
that  restrict the mean strike  probabilities  by year.  Columns  (3)-(5) 
introduce  a set of unrestricted  year effects.  The only one of these 
effects that is individually  significant  is the one for contracts 
negotiated  in 1966:  the sample  contains  2 contracts  from  this year,  both of 
which resulted  in a strike.  A  Wald teat  that the year effects can be 
adequately  summarized  by an indicator  for the 1976-78  period  and an 
indicator  for 1966  has a marginal significance  level of  .05.  Estimatea 
under this restricted  specification  of the year effects  are presented in 
column (2). 
The estimates  without year effects suggest  that  wage and price controls 
during  the 1976-78  period  reduced strike  probabilities  by about 10 
percentage  points.  The effect  of unemployment  is  negative,  but not 
significantly  different  from zero.  The effect  of the real industry  aelling 
price index is positive  and marginally  significant. Unexpectedly  high real 
wage rates  at the end of the preceding  contract  are eatimated to reduce the 
probability  of disputes,  while  higher or lower expected real  wage rates  in 39 
the last contract  have a neglib].e effect  on strike  incidence.  Finally,  the 
occurrence  of one or more wildcat strikes during  the term of the last 
contract increases  the probability  of a strike  in subsequent  contract 
negotiations  by about 16 percentage  points. 
The estimates  with unrestricted  year effects  are generally  simiiar 
although the effects of unemployment  are larger  and the effects of forecast 
errors in the ending  wage of the previous contract  are smaller.  The  fourth 
column  of Table 7 introduces  the percentage  change  in consumer  prices  over 
the previous contract  as an additional  explanatory  variable.  The estimates 
suggest that strike  probabilities  are unaffected  by recent  price  changes, 
controlling  for unexpected  changes in the real wage rate at the end of the 
previous contract.  Finally, 3-digit industry  output is introduced  in the 
model in column (5)  As is true for negotiated  wages, there is no evidence 
that the level  of industry  output  affects  the probability  of  disputes, 
controlling  for the other variables  in the model. 
An alternative  statistical  model  of strike  incidence  is a logistic 
model  with individual  effects: 
(22)  log(p../(l-p..)) —  + 
This model can be estimated  by the conditional  maximum likelihood  scheme 
described in Chamberlain  (1980).  The basis of this approach is the fact 
that the number  of strikes in a  fixed  number  of negotiations  is a 
sufficient  statistic for the pair effect  a. in the logistic  probability 
model.  The  coefficients  can therefore  be estimated  by maximizing  the 
conditional  probability  of an observed  sequence  of strike  outcomes,  which 
is just the unconditional  probability  of the sequence,  divided by the sum 40 
of the probabilities  of the alternative  sequences  with the same number  of 
strikes. 
This scheme  is unwieldy for a panel in which the number  of negotiations 
for each bargaining  pair ranges  from 4 to  16.  1  therefore  selected  a 
balanced  panel of 5 negotiations  for the subset  of pairs with at least  6 
negotiations  in the data set.  (One pre-sample  observation  is needed  to 
calculate  wage outcomes in the preceding  contract).  This panel contains 
222 bargaining  pairs and a total of 1110 contract  observations.  The average 
strike  probability  and duration  in the balanced  panel are 26.1  percent and 
58.1 days,  respectively.  Since  the conditional  likelihood  of either  0 or 5 
strikes in 5 negotiations  is  I,  the model is actually  estimated  over the 
subset  of 152 pairs  with 1 to 4 strikes  in 5 consecutive  negotiations.  A 
total  of 69 pairs in the subsample  had  ito strikes,  while 1 pair had 5. 
Estimation  results for the conditional  logit  procedure  applied  to the 
balanced subsample  of contract  negotiations  are presented in columns (6)- 
(9) of Table 7.  For ease of comparison  with the estimates  from the linear 
probability  specification,  I have multiplied  the estimated  coefficients  and 
their  standard errors  by  .261(1-261).  A model  without year effects is 
presented in column (6), while unrestricted  year effects  are introduced  in 
column (7).  A comparison  of the maximized  log-likelihoods  (in row 10.  of 
the table)  suggests that the year effects  are jointly insignificant  in this 
subsample.49 They are therefore  excluded  from the models in columns  (8) 
and (9). 
Overall, the estimation  results  are fairly  similar to those  in columns 
(l)-(5),  although the estimated  effect  of unemployment  is slightly  larger 
49  .  .  .  .  The  probability  value  of  the  test statistic  is  .44. 41 
using the conditional  logit  procedure  on the balanced sample,  and the 
estimated  effect  of wildcat disputes is smaller.  These  differences  are 
apparently  due to the change  in estimation  technique:  estimates  of the 
first-differenced  linear  probability  specification  on  the balanced 
subsample  are very similar to those  in columns  (1) 
-  (4). 
In summary, the results  in  Table 7 suggest  that strike  probabilities 
are reduced by higher unemployment  and increased  by higher  industry- 
specific selling  prices.  In addition,  strike  probabilities  are lower  in 
situations  where real  wages were unexpectedly  high at the end of the 
preceding contract.  By comparison,  the level  of expected  real wages in the 
previous contract  and changes  in prices  during  that contract  have 
statistically  insignificant  effects  on the probability  of a dispute. 
Taken together  with the results  in Section  III,  these  results  present 
something  of a puzzle for the signalling  model of  strikes.  The estimated 
negative  effects of unemployment  on wage rates and strike  probabilities  are 
Consistent  with the signalling  model and the hypothesis  that higher 
unemployment reduces  the alternative  wage.  The estimated  positive effect 
of industry  selling prices  on wages is also  consistent  with the  idea  that 
unions earn higher  wages in periods of higher  profitability.  The positive 
effect of selling prices  on strike  probabilities,  however,  is inconsistent 
with the model.  In fact,  increases  in profitability  are predicted  to 
decrease strike  probabilities  by virtually  any modeL of strikes  that 
incorporates  the notion  of the joint cost  of a dispute50 
It is also difficult  to explain  the effects of forecast  errors in the 
ending  wage rate of the previous  contract  within the framework  of the 
50  This was first  noted by Kennan (1980). 42 
signalling  model.  If forecast  errors  in contract  wages reflect aiailar 
changes in alternative  wage opportunities,  as their  effect  on wages 
suggest,  then  positive  forecast  errors  should  increase  the probability  of 
strikes,  The estiaates  suggest  that the opposite  is true.  Finally,  the 
positive correlation  between wildcat  strikes  and the probability  of 
subsequent  contract  strikes,  with no corresponding  effect  on negotiated 
wage rates,  presents  a further puzzle  for the signalling  model. 
P/b. Models of Strike  Duration 
Table 8 presents  some alternative  models for the determinants  of 
completed  strike  duration.  In each case,  in order to control  for pair- 
specific  heterogeneity  and to help normalize  strike  duration for the  length 
of the prospective  contract,  the estimated  models  include  bargaining  pair 
effects.  The strikes  are drawn from the sample  of negotiations  used in the 
estimation  of the wage equations in  Tables  4-6,  and in  the  linear 
probability  strike incidence  models  in Table 7.  The sample  includes  402 
strikes from 1765  negotiations  of 298 bargaining  pairs.51  Among theae 
pairs,  2D3 had at least  1 strike,  and therefore  contribute  to the anaiyeie 
of covariance. 
The estimated  regression  functions  in Table 8 can be interpreted 
directly  as estimates  of the expected  log strike  duration  function.  On the 
assumption  that strike  durations  are exponentially  distributed,  these 
estimates  can also be interpreted  as estimates  of the logarithm  of the 
51'The  sample  in Tables  4-6 and in the first  4 columns of Table 7 
includes 1467 negotiations  for 298 pairs.  Since  the estimation  is carried 
out in first  differences,  a total  of 1765 contract  negotiations  is acrua].ly 
used. 43 
inverse  hazard function.52 In particular,  if  the duration S 
of the 
strike  for the th  bargaining  pair is exponentially  distributed  with hazard 
then 
E( log(S)  ik 
— constant  -  log ik' 
(see  Jones (1987,  p. 7)).  In this case,  the linear  specifications  for  the 
log of completed  strike duration in Table 8 are equivalent  to a linear 
specification  of the log hazard. 
The  first  column  of table  8 presents  estimates  based on a model of 
expected  duration  with a constant intercept  across  the different  years of 
the sample,  apart from the 1976-78  period.  Unrestricted  year effects  are 
introduced  in columns (2)-(4).  These  variables  significantly  improve  the 
fit of the model: the test statistic  for the comparison  of the models Ic 
columns (1)  and (2) has a marginal significance  level  of  004. 
The estimated  effect  of the provincial  unemployment  rate on the log of 
strike  duration is very poorly determined  in all four  columns of the  table. 
Real industry  selling  prices appear  to exert  a positive effect  on strike 
duration, although  the estimated  coefficients  are not  significantly 
53 
different from zero.  The forecast  error in the endrng  wage of the 
previous contract  has a large and statistically  significant  effect in 
column (1) of the table.  When year effects  are included,  the estimated 
coefficient  is still large, but the precision  of the estimate falls, 
52The exponential  distribution  implies  that the hazard  rate of strike 
settlements  is constant (given  the covariatea).  Judging by the plot of the 
empirical  hazard in Figure 1,  this is perhaps  a reasonable  hypothesis. 
53  -  .  .  .  . 
A  similar finding  is reported  by McConnell  (1987a).  She finds  no 
strong correlation  between conditional  strike  duration and industry  selling 
prices,  even though strike  probabilities  and selling  prices  are 
significantly  related in her data set. 44 
Neither  the level  of expected  wages in the previous  contract  nor the 
occurrence  of a wildcat strike  has a statistically  significant  effect  on 
expected  duration. 
The model in column (3)  introduces  the change  in consumer  prices over 
the previous contract  as an additional  explanatory  variable,  while  3-digit 
industry  output is included  in column (4).  changes in consumer  prices  do 
not significantly  affect  expected  duration.  The level  of industry  output, 
however,  appears to have a negative  effect  on expected  duration.tO This 
finding confirms the results  of Harrison  and Stewart  (1986)  ,  who  report  a 
positive  correlation  between  the strike  settlement  rate and the index  of 
industrial  production  for d large sample  of strikes  from the Canadian 
manufacturing  sector. 
Given the imprecision  of the estimates  in  Table 8, it is difficult to 
draw firm  conclusions  about  the relevance  of the signalling  model  for 
observed strike  durations, On  one hand,  there is weak evidence  that 
expected strike  durations  are positively  correlated  with industry  selling 
prices.  Assuming that  higher prices  imply  higher  profitability,  this  is 
inconsistent  with the signalling  model  or any other model  of strikes tdat 
accounts for the joint cost of work stoppages.  On the other  hand,  there  is 
some evidence  of a negative correlation  between strike  duration and 
industry  output.  While this may be interpreted  as evidence in favor  of the 
model,  it is important  to keep in mind that industry  output  has no 
corresponding  effect  on strike  probabilities  or negotiated  wages.  By 
comparison,  the provincial  unemployment  rate,  which has negative  effects on 
54There  is of course  a potential  simultaneity  problem between strike 
duration  and output.  A long strike may reduce  measured industry  output if 
the affected firm is large  enough. 45 
negotiated  wages and strike  probabilities,  has no strong  effect  on expected 
strike  duration.  Finally,  forecast  errors in the ending  real  wage rate  of 
the previous contract  appear  to have positive effects  on the duration  of 
strikes.  Again, this  finding  is difficult  to reconcile  with their  positive 
effect on negotiated  wages. 
V. Conclusions 
This paper  has presented  and tested  a simple  model of strikes  based on 
the hypothesis that unions  use costly  disputes to price  discriminate 
against more profitable  employers.  In the absence of direct information  on 
the demand  conditions  facing  the firm,  the union  presents the employer  with 
a downward sloping  wage-concession  schedule.  Faced  with such a schedule, 
the firm select  higher  wages and shorter  strikes in more profitable  states, 
and lower  wages and longer  strikes in less profitable  states.  The model 
predicts that  wage rates,  strike  probabilities,  and average strike 
durations  all depend  on the same set of variables.  These include  the mean 
and dispersion  of unobservable  profitability,  the expected  gap between 
productivity  inside  and outside  the firm,  and workers'  risk preferences. 
In common  with many other  theories  of strikes,  the model predicts  that 
strike incidence  and duration  will decrease  when the joint costs of strikes 
increase.  Thus,  increases  in expected  profitability  are predicted  to 
reduce the probability  and duration  of work stoppages,  while increases  in 
the alternative  wage are predicted  to increase  both.  The model also 
predicts that  wages will rise with increases  in the alternative  wage,  and 
rise with increases  in the expected  profitability  of the firm. 46 
The implications  of the theory  are tested  on a sample  of collective 
bargaining  agreements  from the Canadian  manufacturing  sector.  A simple 
model of contractual  wage rates  is developed,  based on the expected  average 
real wage rate during the term  of the agreement.  Negotiated  wage rates  are 
found to depend on the regional  unemployment  rate,  the industry-specific 
selling  price,  and the level  and unexpected  change in real  wage rates  in 
the previous agreement.  Contrary  to the basic premise  of the model, 
however,  there is no evidence that  wage rates  vary systematically  with the 
duration  or incidence  of strikes. 
Simple  statistical  models  are also developed  for the probability  and 
conditional  duration  of strikes.  As predicted  by the theory,  increases  in 
unemployment,  which are interpreted  as reductions  in the alternative  wage, 
decrease the negotiated  wage and decrease  the probability  of strikes.  In 
contrast, the estimated  effects  of industry  selling  prices  are inconsistent 
with the theoretical  model.  Increases  in selling prices  are found to 
increase  the negotiated  wage,  and also increase  the probability  of 
disputes.  The latter finding  seems  to contradict  the prediction  that 
strike losses  will be lower when the opportunity  costs  of strike  activity 
are higher.  There is some evidence  that expected  strike  duration  is 
negatively  related to industry  output.  Again,  however, this effect is 
difficult  to reconcile  with the predictions  of the model,  since  neither 
wages nor strike  probabilities  are correlated  with industry  output. 
On balance,  the evidence  in favor of the signalling  interpretation  cC 
strike  activity is weak.  Neither the predicted  structural  relation  between 
wages and strikes,  nor the predicted  reduced form  relation for wages, 
strike  probabilities,  and strike  durations  is found in the data.  Further 47 
theoretical  and empirical  research  will obviously  be required  to fully 
describe the determinants  of wages  and strike  outcomes  in these data. 48 
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Data Appendix 
1.  Mersing Strike  Durations  to Contract  Settlements 
The merging process involved  two steps.  First,  firm and union  names, 
locations,  and settlement  dates were listed  for all contracts  on the Wage 
Tape that  were recorded  as settling  after  a work stoppage.  The appropriat, 
issue  of Strikes and Lockouts in Canada (SLC) was then checked  for 
information  on the duration  of the dispute.  Second,  in order  to identify 
strikes that  were reported in  but not recorded  on the Wage Tape,  every 
strike  listing in  from 1964 to 1984  was checked  against the list of 
firm and union names  generated from  the contract  data set 
The results from the first  step of the merging process revealed  a 
probable coding  error on the Wage Tape for settlements  in 1980-81.  Ir.  these 
two years 51 agreements  were coded as settling  at the stage of "bargaining 
after a work stoppage".  Except  in these  two years,  this is a relatively 
rare settlement  code on the Wage Tape.  Furthermore,  in none of the cases 
was there either  a matching  strike listing  in  ,  or  a record  of the 
strike  in the contract  extract published  in Labour  Canada's Collective 
Bargaining  Review.  I have therefore  assumed  that these agreements  were all 
settled  without a work stoppage. 
The results from the second  step of the merging process revealed  thot 
in approximately  five percent of cases  where  no strike  was recorded  on tn 
Wage Tape,  a strike  actually  occurred during  the contract  negotiations 
These strikes  were distinguished  from intra-contract  wildcat strikes  by 
their  dates and by SLC information  on the cause  of the dispute. 
The  following  table  shows the distribution  of final strike  outcomes  by 52 
their  original  recording  status  on the Wage Tape fot the entire sample  of 
2,868  manufacturing  contracts: 
orisinal  Status 
No Strike 
Final  No Strike  2145  51 
Status 
Strike  100  572 
There  were a total  of 21 strikes  for which strike  duration  information 
was not found in SLC.  These include  16 strikes in contracts  with effective 
dates in late 1984 and 1985,  for which  information  is not yet 
available,  and five strikes in  contracts  from  previous years.  These are 
also 28 instances  of strikes  that occurred  in two or more apella.  in moat 
of these  cases, the initial  apell(a)  lasted  less than one week.  For those 
strikes  I recorded strike  duration  as the duration  of che longest spoiL 
2.  Merpin Contracts  Between  the Same  Firm and Union 
The Wage Tape contains  many instancea  of duplicate  contracts  between 
the same firm  and union covering  different  establishments  or groupa  of 
establishments.  Two contract  chronologies  were merged  together if they had 
the aame date,  wage,  and work stoppage  information.  There are abc oases 
where several firms  bargain together,  and where the Wage Tape liars  those 
bargaining  units separately  for some contract  negotiations,  and jointly for 
ocher  negoriationa.  In these  cases  I merged together  the related  oonroscrs 
in all years to form a single  chronology  for the multiple-employer 
bargaining  unit.  Finally,  there  are some  cases  where the Wage Tape 
identification  number for a given  bargaining  unit changes between 53 
negotiations,  as a result  of firm ownership  changes or for other  unknown 
reasons.  In these  cases I concatenated  the contract  chronologies  to form  e 
single  continuous  chronology. 
3.  Continuity  of Base Wage Rates 
In some  cases the base wage rate definition  changes between 
consecutive  contracts  on the Wage Tape (for example,  between  janitors  and 
sweepers"  in one contract  and "assemblers"  in  the next)  The cooing  wage 
rate for each contract  was checked against  the wage reported in the next 
contract  as the "old rate".  In cases  where a change  of definition 
occurred, the base wage series were index-linked  to form  a consistent  wage 
series. 
4.  Agaresate  Data 
The following  aggregate  monthly data  was merged  to each  contract 
listing,  by the effective  date of the contract. 
(a)  Average  hourly earnings in  all manufacturing.  January 1961 to 
March 1983:  Cansim  Dl518,  from the 1983  University  Base Tapo 
(December  1983 Release).  April 1983 to June 1986:  Cansim  LcG.' 
from the  Bank of Canada  Review,  various  issues.  Observations 
from April 1983  and later are multiplied  by 1.04035,  to reflect 
the revision  in the establishment  survey. 
b.  Consumer  price index, all items,  1961  100.  January  1961  to 
November 1985:  Cansim  D484000,  from  the  1985 University Bse 
Tape.  December 1985 to June 1986:  Cansim  D484000,  from the 
Bank of Canada  Review,  November 1986. 54 
c.  Unemployment  rates,  seasonally  adjusted.  Rates for January 1966- 
November 1983  were obtained from the 1983 Cansim  University  Base 
Tape.  Rates for December 1983-December  1985 were  obtained from 
the Bank of Canada  Review,  November  1986.  The following  serIes 
were used:  Quebec-Cansim  D768478;  Ontarto-Cansim  D7138648; 
British Columbia-Cansim  D769233;  all other provinces-Cansim 
D767611 (national  rate). 
d.  Industry selling  prices  and indexes of output.  Three digit 
industry  data for 1961-1971  were taken from  Statistic  Canada, 
Real Domestic  Product  by Industry  1961-71  (Ottawa:  Statistics 
Canada).  These  data are classified  by industry  on the basis of 
the 1960 standard industrial  codes.  Data  on a 1971 industry  code 
basis for 1971-83  were taken  from the 1978 and 1984 issues  of 
Gross Domestic  Product  by Industry  (Ottawa:  Statistics  Canada) 
The 1960 and 1971 industry  codes  were then  matched  and the price 
and output series  were spliced  at 1971.  There  were 31 (of 65)  5- 
digit industries  for which data  was not available  ona consistent 














































































































































































































































































































































































































nTable  I 
Characteristics of Negotiated  WagRates and  Measures  of 
1.  Food and  Beverages 
2.  Tobacco 
3.  Rubber 
4. Leather 
5.  Textiles 
6. Clothing 
7.  Wood Products 
8. Furniture 
9.  Paper 
10.  Printing 
11. Primary  Metals 
12. Metal  Fabricati.c 
33.  Machinery 
14. Transportation  Eqoip 
15.  Electrical  Equip. 
16. Non—metallic  Minerals  14 
17. Petroleum 
Average  Average  Real 
Contract  Wage Rate 
Length  During 
lsonths)  Contract 
37  321  23  6  7.88 
5  38  22  3  8  51 
11  61  33  8  7.25 
4  28  28  2  4.81 
14  303  27  8  6  22 
3"  3l  27 7  4  91 
&  1"  ..3 8  3  91 
1  21  20.2  666 
10  308  26  3  31  49 
9  83  21.3  7.S 
.34  246  28.8 
8  55  23.2 
13  92  25.7 
35  260  29.3 
34  240  26.) 
100  25.8 
Strike  Strike Duration 
Probability  (daysj 
_Average  Median 
46.8  39 
290  29 
43.7 
.30,3  13 
49.6  30 
10.6  11 
51.0  45 
37.5  24 
83.9  71 




14  3 
29 1 
7,5 
34  0 
28  & 
21.8 
8.4 
60.0  43 
53.8  20 
352  32 
52.0  33 
38.5  30 
60.4  3 
107  1170  l7 
Note  Sample  is described  in Data  Appendix.  Average  real wage rate  in 1981 doilarsl  is 
adjusted  for the yearin  which  the contract  is effective. 
Number  Number 
Pairs  Contracts 
7.93  21  4 
".63  103 
788  293 
8.05  35.8 
3,68  237 
7  06  21  0 
18.  Chemicals 
19. Miscellaneous 
20. All 
19.7  31  33 
10  82 
4  33 
299  2258 
22  2 
24 . 5 
26  . 3 
6.21 
7  50 
1.3  1 
38.3 
22.  1 
16  9 
47.0 
54  0 
38 
42 
38 Table  2 
Characteristics  of Negotiated  Wage  Rates 
and Measures  of Strike  Activity by Year 
Average  Average  Real 
Year  Number  Contract  Wage Rate  Strike  Strike  Duration 
Contracts  Length  During  Probability __jyJ___ 
(monthsj 
1964  34  35.0  5.53  11.8  23.0  17 
1965  84  31.9  5.75  22.6  30.1  20 
1966  72  27.9  5.68  16.7  56.5  35 
1967  72  28.3  5.90  33.3  42.5  41 
1968  115  27.4  6.26  19.1  53.5  32 
1969  78  26.6  6.18  23.1  59.4  60 
1970  118  28.7  6.72  19.6  46.6  37 
1971  98  29.1  7.20  26.5  41.5  32 
1972  101  26.2  6.71  15.8  59.8  48 
1973  127  27.6  7.26  29.9  39,6  28 
1974  112  26.3  7.68  36.6  48.9  38 
1975  128  24.7  7.84  35,9  103.0  92 
1976  129  23.3  7.88  19.4  63.9  45 
1977  133  20.5  8.14  14.3  25.6  12 
1978  164  22.4  7.85  12.8  68.4  41 
1979  102  25.8  7.85  33.3  44.3  45 
1980  136  27.0  8.15  17.6  75.4  35 
1981  77  26.5  8.11  27.3  61.2  51 
1982  109  24.6  8.41  13.8  57.7  45 
1983  94  24.8  8.07  24.5  25.6  8 
1984  109  29.1  8.67  13.8  49.7  27 
1985  66  28.9  8.35  19.7 
Note:  See notes to  'rable  1.  1964  data includes  one contract  with 
effective in December 1963.  Average real wage (in 1981 dollars) is 
adjusted for the  two—digit  industry  composition  of contracts  in each 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table  4 
Detereinantu  of  Expected  Average  WagEs 
(standard  errors  in parentheses) 
Dependent  Variable:  First Difference  of 
Price-  Fnrecostin  g Method  1 
iT5'  2)  (3)  (4) 
.299 
(.086) 
Expected  Average  Real Wsge Rate5 
Price—Forecasting  Method  2  L JiL  fl  Jit 
No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
—.432  —.372  -.669  —.536 
(.010)  (.122)  (.136)  (.120) 
—  .106  .013  .083  —  .009 
(.072)  (.069)  (.095)  (.099) 
-  .009 
(.004) 
.017  .067  .083  .078 
(.022)  (.010)  (.017)  (.017) 
.000  .013  .004  .014 
(.014)  (.011)  (.011)  1  011) 
.420  .260 
(.090)  (.050) 
.305 
(.098) 
Notes: 'The saaple  consists  of 1467 third  and later contracts  for  298 bargaining  pairs negotiated  between 
1966 and 1963.  The  sean  and  standard  deviation  of the dependent  variable  are  .0439  and  .0619 
using  Price  Forecasting  Method  1, nod .040 and .0638 using  Method  2.  The  correlation  between 
the alternstive  dependent  variables  is .94.  All  explanatory  variables  are  entered  in first- 
difference  form,  Estimated  standard  errors ore  calcolated  by  a two—step  procedure  that  occounts 
for a  first-order  saving  average  error  cospaneot  and  conditional  heteroskedasticity. 
Dossy  variables  representing  the  effective  year of the  contract.  Equations  without  yeor effects 
include  linear and quadratic  trend  terms. 
0'Seasonslly  adjusted  provincial  unemploysent  rate during  the effective  sonch  of the  contract. 
4'Logariths  of average  real  wage  rate in all asnofactoring  in effective  month  of the  contract. 
variable  equal to one  for negotistinna  in 0976—78  period,  during  wage and  price  controls 
administered  by  the  Anti-Onflntioo  Board. 
—'2— or 3—digit  annual  industry  selling  price  loden,  deflated  by the consumer  price  index. 
g/2_ or 3—digit  annual  indoatry  output. 
'Test  for  orthoganality  of  residuals  with  instruments  for  lagged  forecast  error  and lagged depen- 
dent  variable,  Instrumento  are  first—differences  of  year  effects  and  the  national  unemployment 
race  (as  •eamored  far  previous  contract)  and  the  first—differences  of the perceotage  change  In 
the  conauaer  price index during  the  previous  contract. 
No 








-  .012 
(.013) 
Yes 






























1.  Year Effecta' 
2. Unemployment  Mates' 
3.  Average  Meal Wage 
is  Manufacturln" 
4. Dummy  fur 1976-78 
Wage—Frice  ControlsE1 
5.  Meal  Industry 
Selling  Pricer 
8.  lodostry  Dutput" 
7. yoet  Error  in 
Ending  Wage Mace  of 
Previous  Contract 
(instrnaeoted) 
8. Expected  Average Wage 
During  Previous  Contract 
(Lagged  Dependent  Variable) 
instrumented) 
9.  Standard  Errar 
10. over-identification 
Teat scitiscich! 
(probability  value  in 
parentheses) 
.045  .042  .041  .040 
27.73 
(.066) 
.048  .043  .043  .042 
35 41 
.008) Notes  See notes to Table 4.  All equations  include  unrestricted  year effects for the  effective  year 
of the  Contract, 
Table  5 
Effects  of Strike  Activity  on Expected  Average  Wag5 
(standard  errors  in parenthesis) 
Dependent  Varlabie  First—Difference  of Expected  Average Real  Wage  Rate 
Price Forecasting  Method 1  Price Forecasting  Method  2 
(5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (11  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1.  Une.ploy.ent  Rate  -.453 
122) 
-  439 
1  1221 
-  442 






(  126) 
-.551 
1  125) 
- 527 
1  1261 
2.  Real Industry 
















1  017) 
3.  Forecast  Error in 
Ending  Wage Rate 





(  0511 
.36i 











4.  Expected  Average 
Wage During  Previous 




1  083) 
297 










1  094) 
.330 
(  0921 




-——  .000 
(.012) 
———  .001 
(.012) 
—  -.012 
(Oil) 
6.  Strike  Incidence  003 
(.002) 
---  .003 
(.002) 
--—  .002 
(.002) 
--—  .002 
(.0021 
7.  Average Strike 
Probability  in Two 
PrevIous  Months 








8.  Wildcat Strike  During 
Previous  Contract 
003 
1  003) 
.002 
(.003) 
--—  --—  .002 
(.004) 
.001 
(  004) 
9.  Standard  Error  .040  040  040  .040  .042  .042  042  .042 Table 6 
Summary  of Estimated  Effects  of  Strike 
Estimated  Effect  of  Strike  Durations  on Expected 
Average  Real Wage Rate: 
Price  Forecasting  Method  1  Price Forecasting  Method  2 





1.  1—14 Days 
(28 percent of strikes) 
2.  15-44  Days 





3.  45—89  Days 





4.  90+ Days 





Notes:  See notes to  Table  4.  Coefficients  of other  variables  included  in the 
regression  are not  reported.  Regressions  include unrestricted  year effects 
for effective  year of the contract,  provincial  unemployment  rate,  real 
industry  selling price,  forecast  error  in ending  wage rate of previous 
contract,  expected  average wage in previous  contract,  average  strike  prob— 
ability  in the previous  two months,  and an indicator  for any  wildcat  strike 
during  the previous  contract. Table 7 
eterminants  of Strike Probabilities 
(standard  errors  on parentheses) 
1.  Unrestricted  Year 
Effects 
2.  Ou.wy for 1976-78 
Wage Price  Controls 
3.  Une.pioycent  Rate 
4.  Real  Industry 
Selling Price 
5.  Forecast  Error in 
Ending  Wage Rate 
of Previous 
Contract 
6.  Expected  Average 
Wage During 
Previous  Contract 
7.  Wildcat  Strike 
During  Previous 
Contract 
8.  Change  in Prices 
During  icr. of 
Previous  Contract 
9.  Real Industry  Output 
10. -2 Log—likelihood 
First—DifferenCed  Linear 
Probability  Models 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
No  1966  Yes  Yes  Yes 
only 
-.10  10  —  -—-  -- 
(.03)  (  03) 
1.34  -l  33 
(106)  (1071 
.51  .19 
.22)  1  .22) 
.71  70 
06)  .35) 
-  06  — 12  - .06 
.34)  (  34)  (  .34) 
.17  .17  .17 
.06)  )  .06) )  .06) 
-  .53 
.34) 
--  .00 
1  .13) 
-  .04  .33 
.34)  )  .21) 
.09  .07 
.05)  )  .04) 
-.30 
.32) 
-—  -  04 
.131 
Notes  "Eati.ated  on 1487 third and later  contracts for  298 bargaining  pairs  The average  strikes 
probability  in the  sa.pie is .22  Esticated standard  errors  are calculated  by a two—step 
procedure  that  accounts  for a first-order  coving average  error co.ponent  and conditional 
heteroskedssticity. Expected  real  wages  are forced  fro.  price forecasts  using  forecasting 
.ethod 1. 
Esticated on data for  S  consecutive  negotiations  for 222  bargaining  pairs  with at leaSt 
8 negotiations  In the data set  The average strike  probability  in the  sa.ple is .28  For 
coaparability wIth the linear  probability  esticates.  the  esti.ated coefficients  and stan- 
dard errors  are cultlplied  by .1924 
Conditional  Logit  Models" 
(6)  (7)  (8)  9) 
No  Yes  No  No 
—  .11 
———  —  ii 
— .11 
(.04)  (.04)  )  .04) 
—4.31  —4.52  —4.12  —4.34 
(1.53)  (2,65)  (1.43)  (154) 
.37  .30  .39  .35 
.19)  (  .22)  )  .19)  (  .19) 
-.97  -.54  -1.24  -.97 
.46)  (  .70)  (  .55)  .46) 
3.40  3  42 
(1.84)  il.84) 
63  .61 
.24)  .24) 
.59  -94 
1  46) (  51) 
-3.40 





















--  546.22  531.00  545.68  546.10 Table 8 
fleterainants of Conditional  Strike  Duration 
(standard  errors  in  parentheses) 
Dependent  Van 
(1) 
able:  Log  of Coapleted 
(2)  (3) 
Strike  Duration 
(4) 
1.  Unrestricted  Year Effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2. Duasy  for 1976—78 Wage 
Price  Controls 
.17 
(  27) 
———  —-—  -—- 
















5.  Forecast  Error  in Ending 










6. Expected  Average  Wage Rate 
During  Previous  Contract 
- .81 







7. Wildcat  Strike  During 
Previous  Contract 
.39 
1  .26) 
.33  . 
.26) 
.34 
(  .26) 
.32 
1.26) 
8. Change  in Prices During 
Tens of Previous  Contract 
---  ---  -.81 
(2.85) 
--- 
9. Real  Industry  Output  ---  ---  ---  --1.96 
1  .82) 
10. Standard  Error  1.29  1.24  1.24  1.22 
Notes:  All equations  contain  203 bargaining  pair effects.  The sample  consists  of 402 
strikes  fros  the Set of second  and later  contracts  for  298 bargaining  pairs 
negotiated  between  1966 and 1983.  The mean and standard  deviation  of the 
dependent  variable  are 3.386 and 1.678. Appendix Table  I 
Real Wage  Changes During the Contract Period 
Average Percent Change  in Real Wages from 
Start of the Contract  ÷1 
Two-Year—  Three-Year-  Three-Year 
4onindexed  Nonindexed  Indexed 
Months Through Contract: 
0  1000  1000  1000 
6  .974  .989  .987 
12  1.013  1.023  1.013 
18  .986  .995  .996 
24  .958  1.031  1.020 
30  1.013  1.006 
36  .991  .992 
Sample Size  728  355  381 Appexdiv  Table  2 
of  cirst-Olff,e,og.d  Wove  taoat)or  for Selerted Sobooo:ao 
a.  Sample  size 
b.  Strike probability 
(per  cent) 
c.  Median  Strike  Duration 
(days) 
d.  Mean  at Dependent 
Var  iabie 
e.  Siandard  Deviation of 
Dependent  Variabie 
a  Fatiasted  Coeffirixets 
(standard errors  in  parentheses) 
Subsample 
Pood and  Pulp  and  Prinry  Transy. 
1966—75  1976—83  Séverages  Paper  Metals  tuoapmext 
A.  Saapie  Characteristics 
1.  unemployment Sate 
2.  Scsi  industry 
Selling  Price 
3.  Porecast  Error Is 
Ending Wage  Rate  of 
Previous  Contract 
Instrumented) 
4.  Expected  Average  Wage 
Daring  Previous  Contract 
(Lagged Dependent  Psriabie) 
(instrumented) 
2.  Average  Strike 
Probability  in Two 
Previous  Month. 
6.  Wildcat  Strike  During 
Previous  contract 
7.  Strike  1—14  days 
S.  Strike  19—44  dnys 
S.  Strike  45—95  days 
iS.  Strike 98+  day. 
ii.  Standard  Error 
150  077  223  20D  154  i64 
28.1  10.0  14.4  26.0  27.0  34.0 
42  38  43  72  34  34 
.06W  .014  .041  .045  .054  .siu 
.056  .046  .062  .050  .058  .071 
.205  —.156  —.395  .122  —.724  —.107 
(.328)  (.113)  (.296)  (.198)  (.430)  (.551) 
.068  .875  .046  .167  .211  .045 
(.024)  (.017)  (.044)  (.878)  (.lId)  (  101) 
.384  .340  .458  .393  .310  .383 
(.103)  (  057)  (.125)  (.131)  (.143)  (.105) 
.216  .224  .163  .279  .101  '-148 
(.127)  (.069)  (.142)  (.149)  (.139)  (.111) 
.017  .017  .040  .039  .010  - .030 
(.018)  (.006)  (.019)  (.021)  (Cli)  1.020) 
.001  .003  .086  .006  .006  .004 
(.006)  (.003)  (.089)  (.005)  (.010)  (  010) 
.006  .000  .004  .013  .014 
— .003 
(.006)  (.004)  (.013)  (.008)  (.011)  (.0)0) 
.002  -.004  .006  .003  .007  '-.008 
(.000)  (.004)  (.018)  (.001)  (Oil)  Oil) 
.003  .010  .006  .006  -  .012  '-.012 
(.006)  (.004)  (.008)  (.006)  (.010)  (.012) 
.006  .006  .009  .005  —  .006  .007 
(.007)  (.004)  ).O15(  (.006)  (.010)  (.011) 
.046  .034  .036  .024  .041  .040 
Notes:  See  notes  ta Table  5.  Dependent  variable  is first—difference  of expected  average  real wage. 
Expected  real  cages  are estimated  using  price  forecaatixg  method  1  (ace text).  All equations 
inclade  unrestricted  year  effects  for  the  effective  year of the contract.  Estimated  standard  errors 
are  sat corrected  for heterosbedasticity  or serisi  correlation  aithix  harEsixiog  pairs. 